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Public pension plans manage over $3 trillion 
in assets on behalf of millions of state and 
local government workers across the country. 
The trustees of such plans (“Trustees”) invest 
the bulk of these assets into a variety of 
equities and bonds, with the hopes of earning 
sufficient returns to finance the retirement 
of these countless public sector workers. In 
recent years however, Trustees have grown 
more creative in selecting their underlying 
investment allocations. Alternative investments, 
such as hedge funds and private equity funds 
for example provide unique opportunities for 
Trustees to maximize returns, protect against 
declining markets, and to diversify their 
underlying portfolios. 
 
Private funds are uniquely situated to provide 
these benefits to investors. These vehicles can 
access an entire universe of strategies that 
are not equally available to their registered 
counterparts. Most importantly, private funds 
are exempt from regulatory constraints on 
leverage and can therefore rely on a plethora 
of exotic derivatives to pursue “absolute 
returns” irrespective of market conditions. 
They also have more freedoms to trade illiquid 
investments, non-U.S. opportunities, and 
other innovative financial products that are 
considered too risky for average investors. 
Private funds often attract the best managerial 
talent to take advantage of these broad liberties, 
leading to yet another attractive feature of these 
investment vehicles.  Studies have estimated 
that public pension plans account for close 
to 30% of the aggregate capital invested in 
alternative assets. Several commentators 
anticipate that this figure will continue to grow 
as public pension plans face increasing funding 
challenges related to market turmoil, swelling 
life-spans, and the simultaneous retirement of 
millions of baby-boomers.
While private funds can provide several 
benefits for public pension plans, they create 
distinct challenges for Trustees in terms of 
administering their fiduciary duties. These 
duties generally obligate Trustees to act for 
the exclusive benefit of plan beneficiaries in 
managing plan assets. Since public pension 
plans are exempt from the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”) and subject to varying degrees of 
regulation under their respective states, they 
must consult several sources in determining 
the precise contours of these duties. Trustees 
must consistently evaluate state constitutions 
and statutes, common law, and plan 
documents. Even still, commonalities emerge 
particularly with respect to the omnipresent 
duty of prudence. Under this duty, states 
often adopt the standard provided under 
Section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA which obligates 
fiduciaries to manage the plan “with the care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims.” This essentially requires that Trustees 
utilize reasonable expertise and diligence in 
selecting investment allocations for pension 
plan portfolios so as to protect beneficiaries 
from excessive losses.
Carrying out this duty with respect to 
alternative investments can be quite difficult 
since private funds are not subject to the 
same regulatory scrutiny as public equity 
investments. Although the Dodd-Frank Act 
has subjected private funds to a degree of 
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), these entities are still 
exempt from several layers of federal legislation 
such as the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Thus, 
as investors in these private entities, public 
pension plans are not entitled to detailed 
disclosures related to private fund strategies 
and operations. Excluded information can 
encompass specific position data as well as 
total exposure to leverage. This limited access 
to information can make it difficult for Trustees 
to appropriately evaluate the risks of allocating 
to alternative assets. This is particularly 
problematic since regulatory exemptions allow 
private funds to pursue riskier strategies that 
could expose pension plans to undue losses. 
Access to unlimited leverage can significantly 
enhance returns, but could lead to crippling 
losses as demonstrated by several infamous 
hedge fund failures over the past decades. The 
complexity of private fund strategies can also 
make it difficult for Trustees to administer the 
proper expertise needed to evaluate whether 
they are prudent investments. Alternative 
strategies can be dynamic in nature where 
advisers frequently change investment 
allocations, leading to dynamic measures of 
risk that are constantly changing over the 
course of a pension plan’s investment. Valuing 
the underlying assets of such strategies can be 
equally difficult if they are illiquid in nature 
and therefore beholden to elaborate, and 
sometimes inconsistent, valuation calculations. 
To protect against fiduciary breaches, Trustees 
frequently demand enhanced transparency 
from private funds. They utilize extensive 
resources in analyzing and scrutinizing this 
additional information. This prevailing practice 
is consistent with traditional notions of investor 
protection which presumes that institutional 
investors have the resources to appropriately 
protect themselves against investor protection 
harms. However, this due diligence process can 
be quite expensive, especially in the context of 
evaluating a large range of potential investment 
opportunities. With the thousands of available 
private funds, coupled with the heterogeneous 
nature of the industry, Trustees may not 
have the resources to sufficiently optimize 
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their alternative asset selections. Private 
Fund advisers may also be unresponsive to 
such disclosure requests so as to protect the 
proprietary nature of their strategies. The 
extent to which private funds grant such 
requests may further depend on the bargaining 
power of the institutional investor. Smaller 
pension plans may encounter difficulties in 
accessing the necessary information to prevent 
fiduciary breaches.
Private funds should consider voluntarily 
increasing transparency to public pension 
plans to reduce the likelihood of fiduciary 
breaches by this category of investors. A 
coordinated market response of this nature 
could deter regulators from implementing 
reactionary regulation that would likely 
be haphazard and excessively restrictive. 
Lawmakers often react to financial disasters 
in this manner given the political pressure to 
quickly develop preventative solutions. The 
great financial crisis of 2007-2010 provides 
the perfect example as the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) was hastily passed 
in an effort to prevent future crises of this 
magnitude. Regulators are still untangling the 
myriad of financial reforms mandated under 
this extensive legislation.
With respect to the investment fund industry, 
the Dodd-Frank Act has arguably extended the 
intricate patchwork of regulation that applies to 
these entities, while doing little to alleviate the 
systemic risk concerns expressed by regulators. 
This new regulation requires that private 
fund advisers register under the Advisers Act, 
which is widely known as the least restrictive 
amongst the federal securities laws. It also 
empowers the SEC to collect confidential 
information from private funds, and to disclose 
this information to the newly created Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). FSOC 
was created by Congress to monitor and 
regulate systemic risk. Private funds could fall 
under FSOC’s jurisdiction due to their abilities 
to create and transmit systemic risk. However, 
FSOC has yet to define appropriate measures 
of systemic risk and the likelihood of a private 
fund being identified as systemically harmful 
has significantly declined due to push back 
from the industry. The Dodd-Frank Act also 
expanded authority granted to the CFTC by 
mandating that certain OTC derivatives be 
cleared through registered clearinghouses. 
It then retooled many CFTC exemptions so 
as to force a larger number of private funds 
to register with the commission. Yet, many 
commentators are concerned that systemic 
risk will instead be concentrated within such 
clearinghouses. The increased compliance costs 
associated with dual regulation by the SEC and 
CFTC could likewise outweigh the benefits of 
this potentially redundant regulation. 
If multiple fiduciary failures occur related to 
private funds, lawmakers will likely respond 
in a similar fashion by hastily implementing 
additional legislation to further restrict public 
pension plans from accessing alternative 
investments. With respect to private funds, 
the SEC has already expressed an interest in 
implementing prudential regulation over its 
regulated industries. This could entail setting 
arbitrary limits on leverage and derivatives 
trading, and other stringent capital restrictions. 
In regards to public pension plans, states may 
respond by implementing caps on alternative 
asset investments, reducing the existing caps 
on such allocations, or eliminating access to 
private funds altogether. Lawmakers could 
even respond by creating new commissions 
or self-regulatory organizations that are fully 
dedicated to regulating alternative investments. 
A reform of this nature could provide 
regulators with additional expertise to assist 
in crafting effective regulations. However, 
there is a strong likelihood that these kinds of 
measures could further complicate the web of 
financial regulation applicable to these entities. 
Determining the appropriateness of these 
reforms admittedly depends on the severity of 
any such market failure. Such drastic measures 
may indeed be necessary if excessive losses do 
in fact result from private fund investments.  
Nevertheless, a coordinated market response 
via enhanced transparency could prevent these 
kinds of losses, including the direct and indirect 
costs of implementing restrictive regulations. 
In spite of the legitimate concerns of leaking 
proprietary information to public pension plans, 
enhanced transparency can actually benefit the 
private fund industry. It can provide private 
funds with a valuable marketing opportunity 
to distinguish themselves within an industry 
that has grown increasingly saturated. With the 
numerous reports that private funds cannot 
effectively beat the markets, among other 
notable criticisms, differentiating from the 
crowd in this manner can prove quite valuable. 
Institutional investors have been progressively 
demanding additional transparency from private 
funds in response to these critiques. Meeting 
this demand would likely build the credibility 
of the industry as private funds could use 
this opportunity to highlight the many ways 
in which they benefit the financial markets. 
Disclosing these strengths could in turn create 
prevailing market standards that may incentivize 
“good behavior” for industry participants. 
By and large, improved transparency will 
undoubtedly make it easier for Trustees to 
fulfill their fiduciary obligations. Even still, 
pension plans face additional hurdles in 
optimizing alternative asset investments that 
will require continuous research by a range of 
disciplines. These issues largely relate to the 
lack of standardization in the alternative asset 
space. Private funds are not obligated to follow 
standardized procedures in terms of calculating 
valuations or fees. This lack of standardization 
can make it exceedingly difficult for Trustees 
to appropriately evaluate a private fund 
investment in relation to other comparable 
funds. Inordinately complex fee structures 
have recently engendered controversy as 
institutional investors have withdrawn from 
private funds due to the complexity and 
excessiveness of such fees. Moreover, as briefly 
discussed above, the increasing “publicness” 
of private funds has not been sufficiently 
regulated under recent financial reforms. This 
exposes pension plans to the possibility of 
allocating assets to systemically harmful funds. 
These issues are not easily fixed by existing 
regulatory frameworks and would likely 
necessitate a wholesale review of the intricate 
layers of laws that apply to these industries. As 
markets continue to evolve, lawmakers should 
consider dedicating significant regulatory 
resources to the development of proactive 
regulation that is holistically responsive to the 
realities of the marketplace. Regulations that 
sufficiently incorporate the heterogeneous 
nature of alternative investments are an 
absolute necessity in this regard. 
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